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INTRODUCTION
Appellants, through counsel, respectfully submit the following Brief of the
Appellants, pursuant to Rules 24, 26 and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
JURISDICTION
This appeal is taken from a final order of the Seventh Judicial District Court,
Carbon County, State of Utah, granting Defendant Oakwood's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002 & Supp.2005) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)G)(2002 & Supp. 2005).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE #1:

Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's motion for

summary judgment where facts pertaining to Appellee's liability were in dispute.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

In

considering

a

grant

of

summary

judgment, the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness,
giving no deference, and reviews the facts and inferences to be drawn from the
facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

Utah R. Civ. P.

56(c)(2005); Drysdale v. Ford Motor Company, 947 P.2d 678, (Utah 1997).

1

SUPPORTING AUTHORITY: Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2002 & Supp.
2005); Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) (2005); 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) (1998);1 Interwest
Consti'uction v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350 (Utah 1996); Taylor v. Cooper Tire and
Rubber Co., 130 F.3d 1395 (10th Cir. 1997); Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, (Utah
1998).
ISSUE #2:

Did the trial court err in concluding that a "checklist"

proffered by Appellee proved compliance with government regulations and created
a rebuttable presumption of non-defectiveness, where the document is hearsay, is
not self-authenticating, was not supported by affidavits proving the evidentiary
foundation for the document, and contradicts the Code of Federal Regulations
governing the subject matter at issue?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: In considering the admissibility of evidence,
the appellate court reviews the trial court decision for an abuse of discretion. Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, 979 P.2d 317.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2005);

24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) (1998); Utah R. Evid. 802 (2005); State v. Sibert, 310
P.2d 388, 6 Utah 2d 198 (1957).
1

Title 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 was enacted December 18, 1975. Subsection
(b)(6) provides: "Rodent resistance. All exterior openings around piping and
equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents" was enacted. On
October 25, 1993 the rule was last amended, which continued to have the same
language about "Rodent resistance." Subsection (b)(6) was in effect in 1998 when
the home was manufactured and remains in effect to date.
2

ISSUE #3:

Did the trial court err by considering issues raised for the

first time by Appellee in its reply memorandum in support of summary judgment,
when those issues were not raised in its motion or initial memorandum?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The interpretation of a rule of procedure is a

question of law that is reviewed for correctness. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16
P.3d 540.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:

Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (2005); Utah R. Civ.

P. 56(c) (2005); Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540.
ISSUE #4:

Did the trial court err in granting Rule 54(b) certification

and adopting verbatim Appellee's findings of facts and conclusions of law when
such facts were disputed among remaining parties who were not parties to the
summary judgment proceedings?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

Whether an order is "final" is a question of

law; therefore, the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision on this point
for correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah
1991).
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b)(2005);

Kennecott Corp v. State Tax Comm 'n, 814 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1991).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES
ADDENDUM 1: 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603(b)(6) (1998).

3

ADDENDUM 2: Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 (2002 & Supp. 2005).
ADDENDUM 3: Utah R. Civ. P. 56 (2005).
ADDENDUM 4: Utah R. Evid. 802 (2005).
ADDENDUM 5: Utah R. Civ. P. 7 (2005).
ADDENDUM 6: Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) (2005).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE:

On March 11, 20005 Reid and Cathy

Dimick met their son, Chris Dimick, at the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper to
shop for a manufactured home for Chris. While touring a home that was sitting on
the outdoor sales lot, Cathy and Chris Dimick opened a bedroom closet door and
were exposed to a nest and "droppings" (feces) from deer mice, carriers of
Hantavirus.
On May 27, 2000, within the incubation window for Hantavirus, Cathy
Dimick became violently ill with Hantavirus, and died within three days of the
onset of her illness. Three days after Cathy's death, Chris became violently ill
with Hantavirus.

He survived an extended illness, but is now permanently

disabled.
Defendant/Appellee

Oakwood manufactured the home at issue and

transported it to the sales lot in Utah.

Appellants allege that the home was

defective because Appellee intentionally manufactured 30-50 "knock-out holes"

4

into the sidewalls and underside of the home—and left those holes open and
uncovered—despite having actual knowledge that the home was destined for a
sales lot in Helper, Utah, where Hantavirus-carrying deer mice are commonly
found. Appellants allege that the holes provided access points for deer mice, that
deer mice left hantavirus-laden nestings and droppings in the manufactured home,
and that Cathy and Chris Dimick were thereby exposed to and contracted the
deadly virus.

The ostensible purpose for the holes was to connect electrical and

plumbing hook-ups, once the home was permanently placed on a buyer's
foundation.
On April 11, 2002, Appellants filed a Complaint and Jury Demand against
the manufacturers, Oakwood, and other defendants, including the owners and
operators of the sales lot.
The complaint included claims for Strict Liability; Wrongful Death; Breach
of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; Breach of Warranty of
Merchantability; Breach of Express Warranty; Negligent Failure to Warn; and
Premises Liability.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:

On

October

14,

2004,

Defendant Oakwood, using answers obtained solely from Interrogatories, Requests

For purposes of summary judgment, it was not disputed that the Dimicks
were actually exposed to Hantavirus in the manufactured home. (See R. at 382,
427-433, 453).
5

for Production and Depositions from co-defendants, filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment, attacking only Appellants' strict liability theory. On November 17,
2004, Appellants filed their Memorandum in Opposition to Oakwood Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, noting that were responding to the only claim
attacked by Appellee's motion—the strict liability theory—and noted that
Appellee's motion should more properly have been styled as a Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

On November 24, 2004, Oakwood filed its Reply

Memorandum, attacking for the first time Appellants' claims for Breach of Implied
Warranty (fitness); Breach of Warranty (Merchantability); Breach of Expressed
Warranty; Negligent Failure to Warn; and Premises Liability.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT:

On February 28, 2005,

the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Bruce K. Halliday presiding, heard oral
argument and took the case under advisement. On April 14, 2005, the trial court
granted the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment with directions for the
Appellee to prepare Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Subsequently,

Appellee submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. On April
29, 2005, Appellant timely objected to the proposed Findings and Conclusions as
being unsupported by the record, overbroad, and as seeking Rule 54(b)
certification when that relief had not been sought in Appellee's moving papers.

6

On July 29, 2005, the trial court signed the Order as proposed by Appellee,
without having seen or considered Appellants' objection to the proposed order. On
August 25, 2005, after discovering this oversight, the trial court withdrew its July
29, 2005 Order and scheduled oral argument on Appellants' objection.

On

September 23, 2005, the trial court reissued the Order, as drafted by Appellee, and
certified the Order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b).
The remaining parties are the owner/operators of the sales lot where the
manufactured home sat. The claims against the owner/operators are Wrongful
Death; Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; Breach of
Early in the proceedings in the trial court, Defendant Oakwood filed a
petition for bankruptcy. The real party in interest thereafter (Appellee herein)
became the entity retained to liquidate the bankrupt estate, called the Oakwood
Homes Liquidation Trust. On October 14, 2005, based on the summary judgment
order, Appellee obtained an order from the Bankruptcy Court (in Wilmington,
Delaware) disallowing all of Appellants' claims.
On October 17, 2005,
Appellants—without having been given notice of the Bankruptcy Court's order—
filed their Notice of Appeal. On November 2, 2005, Appellee's bankruptcy
counsel wrote to undersigned counsel, contending that the prosecution of this
appeal violated the Bankruptcy Court's order. On December 12, 2005, Appellants
requested an extension of the briefing schedule in this appeal, to enable the
Bankruptcy Court to hear the "Dimick Claimants' Motion for Reconsideration" of
the Order disallowing their claims. On December 15, 2005, this Court extended
the briefing schedule herein.
On January 30, 2005, after an evidentiary hearing in the bankruptcy court,
the parties stipulated that the Order disallowing the Dimick claims be vacated, and
that Appellee would be responsible to the limits of the $250,000 self insured
retention under Oakwood's liability insurance policies, with any remaining
judgment to be addressed with Appellee's insurance carriers. Thus, this appeal
proceeds unaffected by proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court.

7

Warranty of Merchantability; Breach of Expressed Warranty; Negligent Failure to
Warn; Premises Liability; and Strict Liability.
FACTUAL STATEMENT
1.

Appellee-manufacturer, Oakwood Homes, owned the manufactured

home at issue as it sat on the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah. The title to
each manufactured home is held by a finance company until each home is sold to
consumer(s). (Record on Appeal {hereinafter "R."), at 381, 390-391, 424-425).
2.

When the home manufactured by Oakwood was delivered to the

Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah, it had 30-50 holes in the underside and
exterior walls. The holes were at least large enough for a piece of conduit to fit
through. (R. at 382-384, 398-402).
3.

When homes manufactured by the Oakwood Appellee were delivered

to the Happy Homes sales lot in Helper, there were quite often rips and tears in the
"belly paper" that was intended to cover and seal the underside of the homes. (R.
at 382, 404-409). These rips were so common that the manufacturer regularly
provided rolls of replacement belly paper. (R. at 382, 406-407).
4.

John Schram, an employee of the sales lot in Helper, testified in

deposition that the 30-50 penetrations in the underside and exterior walls of the
manufactured home were for piping and venting and that the holes were sometimes
caulked:

8

Q.
[By Mr. Booke, Appellants' counsel] A little while ago you were
talking about the penetrations that were sometimes put in the modular homes
for plumbing and other reasons?
A.

[By Mr. Schram] Uh-huh.

Q.
Did you caulk those holes as part of patching up the holes or did you
put caulk in the holes that were already there for plumbing or other reasons,
electrical?
A.
The factory puts their plumbing and electrical through the holes and
I'm not sure if they caulk or put like foam, the expanding foam. I think they
do in some instances put the expanding foam around the pipes where they
penetrate.
(R. at 451, 468-469).
5.

John Schram also testified that interior insulation could be seen

through the penetrations in the exterior walls. (R. at 399-401, 464-465).
6.

Oakwood knew that manufactured homes shipped to Happy Homes

were displayed in a lot that was in an open field.

There was no means of

preventing access by deer mice in the field where the homes were displayed. (R. at
382,384,411-413).
7.

It has long been well known in the Price/Helper area that deer mice

are carriers of Hantavirus. (R. at 382, 384, 417-419,421-425).
8.

On March 11, 2000, Reid Dimick, Cathy Dimick and Chris Dimick

went into a home, manufactured by Oakwood, that was sitting on the Happy
Homes sales lot in Helper, Utah. While looking in a bedroom closet, they saw deer
mice nestings and droppings. (R. at 382, 385, 427-434, 436).
9

9.

On May 27, 2000, Cathy Dimick became violently ill with

Hantavirus. She died within three days of the onset of her final illness. Three days
after Cathy's death, Chris became violently ill with Hantavirus.

He is now

permanently disabled as a result of the Hantavirus. (R. at 382-383, 385, 438-444).
10.

Reid Dimick knows of no Hantavirus exposure that Cathy and Chris

could both have suffered, except for their simultaneous exposure in Oakwood's
manufactured home on the Happy Homes sales lot on March 11, 2000. (R. at 383,
385, 446-448).
11.

Oakwood argued to the trial court "They (the homes) have

penetrations in them. Those penetrations are signed off by HUD. They're part of a
checklist the government has said 'Not a problem/ which creates the presumption
that this home was free of defects." (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 16:11-14, February
28, 2005).4
12.

The checklist on which Oakwood relied is silent as to penetrations in

the home. (R. at 331-338).

This factual assertion comes entirely from the oral argument of February
28, 2005 of Appellee's counsel and misrepresents, by material overstatement, what
is actually contained in the record and contained within the checklist.
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13.

The trial court admitted the checklist as evidence, without affidavits

demonstrating any evidentiary foundation for or describing the use of, the
document. (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 5:18-24, February 28, 2005).5
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the record below contains prima facie evidence of each required
element of proof of strict products liability under Utah law—including proof of
non-compliance with governmental regulations.

While the evidence may be

disputed as to certain of the required elements of strict products liability, the
evidence is clearly present in the record.
Second, Appellee's purported "checklist" does not create the rebuttable
presumption found and relied on by the trial court, because it is entirely silent as to
penetrations in the exterior of the home, is contrary to the Code of Federal
Regulations governing manufactured homes, is hearsay, is not self-authenticating,
is not supported by affidavits providing the foundation for the document, and is
otherwise unreliable. Absent the wrongfully-imputed presumption of nondefectiveness, Appellee's summary judgment motion should fail.
Third, and dispositively as to this appeal, the trial court erred in granting
54(b) certification, because the causes of action against remaining defendants are
the same as those that are the subject of the summary judgment order, and are
This evidence comes entirely from the statement and recognition of the
Honorable Bruce K. Halliday during the oral argument on February 28, 2005.
11

based upon substantially the same operative facts. Further, there was just reason
for delay of the 54(b) certification in the present case because of the possible res
judicata effect and because Appellants must now litigate two cases instead of one.
Finally, the trial court erred when it considered and ruled upon issues raised
for the first time in the Appellee's reply memorandum. At a minimum, Appellants
request that the issues presented for the first time in the Appellee's reply
memorandum be remanded to the trial court for further discovery and trial on the
merits.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred by finding that there were no genuine issues of material
fact when the record shows that there were 30-50 "knockout-holes" at least the size
of conduit deliberately manufactured into homes by Appellee, providing an entry
point for Hantavirus-carrying deer mice. The trial court's conclusion was based on
the erroneous assumption that Appellee was entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
non-defectiveness under Utah's products liability statute, because the court
accepted as evidence a checklist that (a) does not address the 30-50 penetrations
present in the home, (b) is clearly hearsay, (c) is not self-authenticating, (d) is not
supported by affidavits providing the foundation for the document, and (e) is
contrary to the enabling statute and rules promulgated by HUD applicable to
manufactured homes.

12

The trial court further erred by allowing Appellee to raise defenses to
Appellants' breach of warranty and failure to warn claims for the first time in a
reply brief when those defenses were not raised in Appellee's moving papers, then
deciding those issues without Appellants having an opportunity to address to those
new issues.
Finally, the trial court erred in granting 54(b) certification for Appellee's
Summary Judgment Order when there remain other non-moving defendants who
are defending the same and similar claims under the same operative facts.
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON APPELLANTS' STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY.

To present a prima facie case for strict products liability against a
manufacturer, a plaintiff must prove that (1) a defect or defective condition in a
product made it unreasonably dangerous, (2) the defect was present at the time of
the product's sale, and (3) the defective condition was the cause of plaintiffs
injuries. Interwest Constr. v. Palmer, 923 P.2d 1350, 1356 (Utah 1996). To defeat
a summary judgment motion, a plaintiff need only show circumstantial evidence,
whether expert or not, that a defect existed. Taylor v. Cooper Tire and Rubber
Co., 130 F.3d 1395, 1398, (10th Cir. 1997) {applying Utah state law); Noncompliance with a government regulation is evidence of a defect or defective
condition. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432, 354 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. (1998).
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These rules are embodied in Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6, which provides:
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property
damage allegedly caused by a defect in a product:
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be
in a defective condition, unless at the time the product was sold
by the manufacturer or other initial seller, there was a defect or
a defective condition in the product which made the product
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer.
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that
the product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be
contemplated by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or
user of that product in that community, considering the
product's characteristics, propensities, risks, dangers and uses
together with any actual knowledge, training, or experience
possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer.
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free
from any defect or defective condition where the alleged defect
in the plans or design for the product or the methods and
techniques of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product
were in conformity with government standards established for
that industry which were in existence at the time the plans or
designs for the product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing that product were
adopted.
(2002 & Supp. 2005).
In considering a grant of summary judgment, this court reviews the trial
court's legal decision for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the facts
and inferences to be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Drysdale v. Ford Motor Co., 947 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah 1997).

14

ANALYSIS
1.

Plaintiffs/Appellants have identified a specific defect
in Defendant/Appellee's product

Reasonable jurors could find that Appellee designed and manufactured a
defect into its home by purposely drilling 30-50 holes in the bottom and sides of
its homes and leaving those holes open and uncovered, thereby creating a point of
entry for rodents—-just as in Taylor, the Tenth Circuit, interpreting Utah law, found
that reasonable men could infer that a wheel was defective by virtue of the
cumulative effect of circumstantial facts. 130 F.3d at 1398.
The intended purpose of the 30-50 holes was to provide quick and,
presumably, inexpensive access for hooking up plumbing and electrical
connections that were "stubbed out" of the foundation on which the manufactured
home was to be set. The unintended result of this design feature, however, was to
create 30-50 portals through which rodents, including deer mice carrying the
Hantavirus, could enter Appellee's manufactured home. Such lack of intention is
not a defense to a strict products liability claim.
The "ease of access" goal could have been easily accomplished—without
creating an open doorway for a potentially fatal virus—by simply placing a
temporary and removable cover over the pre-drilled holes, or by placing a "knockout" plug over each of the holes. Such a design would have closed off some 30-50
ports of entry for rodents. Including a means of covering these rodent portals was
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of particular importance where, as here, the Appellee well knew that the intended
destination for their manufactured home was an open and unprotected field in the
heart of Hantavirus country.6
The additional labor and material required to provide this margin of safety,
however, would have increased manufacturing costs and could have decreased
profits, unless the costs were passed along in the sales price. All things considered,
though, the marginal cost added to an already $65,000.00 home would have been a
tiny price to pay for a huge safety return.
The record of the case, then, does contain specific evidence of an
identifiable defective condition that could easily, inexpensively, and effectively
been remedied. Accordingly, Appellants satisfy their burden of proof under the
summary judgment standard on the first prong of a strict products liability theory.
2.

The defect was present at the time the product was sold.

This is an undisputed fact. The first person to inspect the Appellee's homes
following delivery to Helper from the manufacturing plant—John Schramm—
testified specifically as to the numbers and locations of the open holes in the
underside and sidewalls of the homes. Mr. Schramm also specifically described
the purpose and use of the holes. Without any doubt, the defective condition

6

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) foresaw such a
problem and promulgated 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603, requiring all "exterior openings
around piping to be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents."
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identified and asserted by Appellants was present in the Appellee's manufactured
homes at the time the homes left Appellee's plant and at the time the homes amved
on the Helper lot for resale.

Accordingly, Appellants satisfy their burden on

summary judgment as to the second element of a strict products liability claim.
3.

The defect was the proximate cause of Appellants9 injuries.

Appellee did not dispute this issue below. (Oral Argument Hr'g. Tr. 18:1421, February 28, 2005). Indeed, it is undisputed that Cathy Dimick contracted and
died from Hantavirus, and that Chris Dimick contracted and suffered severe injury
from Hantavirus. It is also undisputed that Cathy and Chris Dimick became ill
within a few days of one another, giving rise to the strong inference that they were
exposed to the virus at the same time and the same place.
Moreover, although Appellee or the remaining defendants may attempt to
offer controverting proof, there is substantial evidence in the record that the only
time and place that Cathy and Chris Dimick were together during the 75-90 day
incubation period for Hantavirus was the single occasion on which they jointly
toured Appellee's manufactured home. (R. at 447-448). Further, while it may
later be disputed, there is substantial evidence in the record that Cathy and Chris
Dimick were not simultaneously exposed to deer mice or hantavirus at any other
time or place in proximity to the onset of their illness. (R. at 383, 385, 446-448).
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4.

The home's non-compliance with applicable government
regulations is prima facie evidence of its defective condition.

The violation of a statute may be regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 432 (Utah 1998). The 30-50 holes that
were built into the home, then left open and uncovered by Appellee, violated
Housing and Urban Development Rules promulgated in 1975 and in effect in 1998.
The applicable Code of Federal Regulations specifically requires that "[a] 11
exterior openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the
entrance of rodents." 24 C.F.R. § 3280.603 (b)(6)7.
The record clearly shows that the "stubbed out" electrical and plumbing
hookups were not "generally caulked" but were in "some instances" believed to
have expanding foam around them. (R. at 468-469). Some of these holes were
clearly not caulked—as evidenced by the fact Mr. Schram could see insulation
through the penetrations. (R. at 399-401, 464-465). Moreover, the record clearly
shows that these holes could be entry points for mice. (R. at 21-22)
Accordingly, the record contains evidence showing the presence of a defect
based on a violation of an applicable government standard.

Appellants were not obligated to rebut the presumption of Utah Code
Ann. § 78-15-6(3) that the home was free from any defect or defective condition
because the home actually failed to comply with the government standards relating
to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured homes.

18

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AND RELYING
UPON AN UNRELIABLE CHECKLIST CHARACTERIZED
BY APPELLEE AS A GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT AND AS
PROOF
OF
COMPLIANCE
WITH
GOVERNMENT
STANDARDS, WHEN THE DOCUMENT IS HEARSAY, IS
NOT SELF-AUTHENTICATING, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
FOUNDATIONAL AFFIDAVITS, AND APPEARS TO
CONTRADICT THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) mandates that evidence proffered on a summary

judgment motion must—on its face—be admissible evidence:
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to
testify to the matters stated therein.
{Emphasis added.) Moreover, hearsay that is not independently trustworthy is not
admitted because the person proffering the facts is not under oath and not subject
to cross-examination. State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 390, 6 Utah 2d 198 (1957).
Here, the document on which Appellee and the trial court relied for claiming
compliance of the manufactured home with government regulations (R. at 331338)—thereby creating a presumption of non-defectiveness—falls far short of
being admissible, competent evidence.

Accordingly, the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting a checklist initialed by multiple unidentified parties and
signed off by an unidentified person, because the document is hearsay, not selfauthenticating, and is not explained or supported by affidavits based on personal
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knowledge stating the competency of the affiant with respect to the specific facts
contained in the document at issue.
In the present case, the purported "HUD Compliance Assurance Inspection
Form" is inherently untrustworthy because it is completely silent as to the specific
federal regulations promulgated by HUD for "Manufactured Home Construction
and Safety" on the precise construction element at issue—"Rodent resistance." As
shown above, HUD regulations require that "[a]ll exterior openings around piping
and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of rodents." 24 C.F.R. §
3280.603 (b)(6) (1998). In contrast, Appellee's purported HUD checklist fails
entirely to address the 30-50 built-in holes or any "exterior openings around
piping."
Furthermore, the checklist appears to be initialed by at least 12 different
unidentified persons and signed by a Ronald Petterson whose role with the
government, if any, is unknown. Nothing authenticates or provides foundation for
the checklist. From the face of the document, it appears to be an in-house and,
therefore, self-serving document, as opposed to an official government approval of
anything.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONSIDERING ISSUES
RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN APPELLEE'S REPLY
MEMORANDUM.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure limit reply memoranda to "rebuttal of

matters raised in the memorandum in opposition." Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1). The
Utah Supreme Court has held that issues raised for the first time in a reply brief
are considered waived and will not be considered. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT
89, ^ 23, 16 P.3d 540. "This is to prevent the resulting unfairness to respondent
if an argument or issue was first raised in the reply brief and the respondent had
no opportunity to respond." Id.
Here, the trial court erred by considering issues raised for the first time in
Appellee's reply memorandum and not raised in the memorandum supporting
Appellee's motion.
Specifically, Appellants' complaint asserts claims for Strict Product
Liability; Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; Breach
of Warranty of Merchantability; Breach of Express Warranty; Negligent Failure to
Warn; and Premises Liability (R. at 171-184, 472-484), but Appellee's summary
judgment motion and supporting memorandum attacked only the strict products
liability theory. Relying thereon, Appellants' opposition addressed only the strict
liability issue. (R. at 379-395).
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Then, in its reply memorandum, Appellee argued for the first time that
summary judgment should be granted on Appellants' Breach of Implied Warranty
of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, Breach of Warranty of Merchantability, Breach
of Express Warranty, Negligent Failure to Warn, and Premises Liability theories.
(R. at 455-459). The trial court then granted Appellee's Motion for Summary
Judgment on all of Appellants' theories of liability. (R. at 615-617).
As a result, Appellants were unfairly precluded from marshaling evidence or
making argument in opposition on any warranty or failure to warn theory—since
these theories

were not attacked

in Appellee's

opening

memorandum.

Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling on any aspect of Appellee's motion
other than the strict products liability theory.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 54(b)
CERTIFICATION BECAUSE THE LEGAL THEORIES AND
OPERATIVE FACTS OF WHICH SUMMARY JUDGMENT
RESTS ARE IDENTICAL TO THEORIES AND FACTS
PENDING AGAINST THE REMAINING DEFENDANTS, AND
BECAUSE THERE IS JUST REASON FOR DELAY.
In pertinent part, Rule 54(b) states:
When more than one claim for relief is present in an action . . . ,
and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the
entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an expressed determination by the court
that there is no just reason for delay and upon an expressed direction
for the entry of judgment.

Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b).
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The Utah Supreme Court has identified three requirements for certification
under Rule 54(b):
First, there must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties to the
action. Second, the judgment appealed from must have been entered
on an order that would be appealable but for the fact that other claims
or parties remain in the action. Third, the trial court, in its discretion,
must make a determination that uthere is no just reason for delay" of
the appeal.
Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 1099, 1101 (Utah 1991)
(quotation omitted). Determining whether an order is "final" is a question of law,
therefore the appellate court reviews the trial court's decision for correctness. Id.
at 1100.
1.

There Are Multiple Claims For Relief And
Parties To This Action.

As shown by the complaint, the first criterion for certification requiring
multiple claims or multiple parties to the action is met. (R. at 171-184).
2.

The Judgment Appealed From Must Have Been Entered On An
Order That Would Be Appealable But For The Fact That Other
Claims Or Parties Remain In The Action.
The second criterion is not met in the instant case because the remaining

claims against other defendants, and the operative facts relative to those claims, are
substantially the same as those certified by the trial court's order.

The Utah

Supreme Court has found that the second criteria is not met where the operative
facts substantially overlap facts that also serve as the basis for other theories
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pending before the trial court. Kennecott, at 1105. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme
Court noted that where the facts are sufficiently similar to constitute res judicata
on the remaining issues, 54(b) certification is generally precluded. Id.
In Kennecott, taxpayers brought an action against the Utah State Tax
Commission and several county and state tax officials. Id. at 1100. The taxpayers
questioned the constitutionality of a state statute under three separate constitutional
provisions. Id. The trial court, in Kennecott, partially granted the tax collectors'
motion for summary judgment, stating the taxpayers did not have standing on one
of the three constitution issues. Id. The trial court certified the order. Id. The
Utah Supreme Court raised the 54(b) certification issue sua sponte. The Utah
Supreme Court noted that the remaining issues were based upon the same
overlapping and operative facts, therefore, the trial court incorrectly certified the
order as final under 54(b). Id. at 1105. Further, the Court noted that facts that
would constitute res judicata would be generally preclude 54(b) certification. Id.
In the present case, the claims against the Appellee were: 1) Strict Products
Liability; 2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose; 3)
Breach of Warranty of Merchantability; 4) Breach of Express Warranty; 5)
Negligent Failure to Warn; and 6) Premises Liability. The claims pending against
the remaining defendants are identical Moreover, the following operative facts—
as to which the trial made findings on summary judgment, and on which the trial
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court based conclusions of law on summary judgment—relate identically to claims
against remaining defendants:
* * *

4.
Happy Homes tendered payment for the Home and the
Home was delivered to Happy Homes' sales lot on June 1998.
5.
Prior to accepting delivery and possession of the Home,
Happy Homes' agents and employees inspected the Home.
6.
Happy Homes' agents and employees did not observe
any problems with, defects in, or defective conditions in the home
when Happy Homes received, inspected, and took possession of the
home. The home was ready for retail sale when received by Happy
Homes.
7.
Happy Homes never notified Oakwood of any problems
with, defects in, or defective conditions of the Home.
8.
On March 11, 2000, Christopher Dimick toured the
Home with his parents, Reid and Cathy Dimick, and that same day
contracted to buy the Home for Happy Homes.
9.
The home sat on Happy Homes rural sales lot in Helper,
Utah from June 1998 until the home was delivered to Christopher
Dimick's property on May 22, 2000.
10. Happy Homes hired John Schram to assemble the Home
on the Happy Homes lot when it was received from Oakwood in 1998
and to disassemble the Home for transport to the Dimick property in
2000. Mr. Schram did not observe any defects in or problems with
the Home on either occasion.
11. Mary Musgrave worked as a sales agent for Happy
Homes in Helper, Utah. Ms. Musgrave showed the Home to
prospective purchasers "countless" times between June 1998 and May
2000. Ms. Musgrave never observed any manufacturing defects in the
Home and never saw any evidence of mice in the Home.
25

(R. at 614-615).
Moreover, as the Supreme Court specifically noted in Kennecott, the trial
court's conclusions of law, based on the foregoing findings of fact, are so grossly
and overly broad that the remaining defendants could assert them as res judicata of
claims remaining against them, and use them as a sword against Appellants:
1.
Plaintiffs failed to rebut the Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3)
presumption that the home was free from any defect or defective
condition because the home complied with government standards
relating to design, manufacture, and inspection of manufactured
homes.
2.
Plaintiffs offered no evidence that the home was
unreasonably dangerous due to a defect or defective condition, no
evidence that a defect existed at the time the home was sold, and no
evidence that a defective condition was the proximate cause of their
alleged injuries. Therefore, plaintiffs' claims against Oakwood for
strict products liability and breach of warranty (merchantability) fail
as a matter of law.
3.
There is no evidence of a defect or defective condition in
the home, a necessary element of plaintiffs claim against Oakwood for
breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and
therefore the claims fail as a matter of law.
4.
There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition
in the home, and no evidence that Oakwood breached any expressed
warranty, and therefore the claims fail as a matter of law.
5.
There is no evidence of any defect or defective condition
in the home, a necessary element of plaintiffs5 claims against
Oakwood for negligent failure to warn, and therefore the claims fail as
a matter of law.
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6.
There is no evidence that Oakwood had any ownership or
possessory interest in the home after it had been sold and delivered to
Happy Homes, therefore Oakwood did not owe any duty to plaintiffs
as a premises owner. Additionally, there is no evidence of a defect or
defective condition, or unsafe condition in the home that proximately
caused plaintiffs' alleged injuries. Because these are necessary
elements of plaintiffs' premises liability claims against Oakwood, the
claim fails as a matter of law.
(R. at 615-617).
Finally, these conclusions of law are contrary to, and are not supported by
any facts in, the record cited by Appellee in its moving or reply memoranda. Thus,
these facts and conclusions, as reflected in the order, could improperly have a res
judicata effect for each and all of the remaining defendants.

This is the very

circumstance that the Utah Supreme Court has held should preclude 54(b)
certification—and explains precisely why the second criteria for certification is not
met in the instant case.
3.

There Is Just Reason for Delay of this Appeal.

There is just reason to have delayed appeal of the present case. First, the
remaining defendants can use the summary judgment order as a sword or shield.
Second, Appellants are being required to litigate two cases (one at the trial court
and this appeal), instead of one—when a refusal to certify the case could well have
resulted in a settlement of the case with the remaining defendants, thereby avoiding
this appeal altogether.

Certification in this case, then, causes "piecemeal"

litigation, rather than serving to avoid it.
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Moreover, there is particular prejudice where, as here, Appellee's summary
judgment memoranda relied exclusively upon intra-defendant depositions and
interrogatories, and the trial court subsequently used that as the sole basis for its
summary judgment order. Certifying the summary judgment order under these
circumstances enables a collusive environment between parties with potentially
adverse interests.
CONCLUSION
Initially, and dispositively as to this appeal, the trial court erred in granting
54(b) certification, because the causes of action against remaining defendants are
the same as those that are the subject of the summary judgment order, and are
based upon substantially the same operative facts. Further, there was just reason
for delay of the 54(b) certification in the present case because of the possible res
judicata effect and because Appellants must now litigate two cases instead of one.
For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant requests that this Court dismiss this
appeal in its entirety as erroneously certified under rule 54(b).
If this appeal is considered, the record below contains prima facie evidence
of each required element of proof of strict products liability under Utah law—
including proof of non-compliance with governmental regulations.

While the

evidence may be disputed as to certain of the required elements of strict products
liability, the evidence is clearly present in the record. Under this circumstance,
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summary judgment is improper and Appellant respectfully requests this Court
remand the case for trial on the merits.
Appellee's purported "checklist7' does not create the rebuttable presumption
found and relied on by the trial court, because it is entirely silent as to penetrations
in the exterior of the home, is contrary to the Code of Federal Regulations
governing manufactured homes, is hearsay, is not self-authenticating, is not
supported by affidavits providing the foundation for the document, and is
otherwise unreliable.

Absent the wrongfilly-imputed presumption of non-

defectiveness, Appellee's summary judgment motion should fail, and the case
should be remanded for trial on the merits.
Finally, the trial court erred when it considered and ruled upon issues raised
for the first time in the Appellee's reply memorandum. At a minimum, Appellants
request that the issues presented for the first time in the Appellee's reply
memorandum be remanded to the trial court for further discovery and trial on the
merits.
P^espectfiilly submitted this 28th day of February 2006.
MORIARITY, BADARUDDIN & BOOKE
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ROBERT D.STRIEPER
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CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
TITLE 24--HOUSENG AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
SUBTITLE B--REGULATIONS RELATING TO HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
CHAPTER XX--OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HOUSING-FEDERAL HOUSING
COMMISSIONER, DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
PART 3280-MANUFACTURED HOME CONSTRUCTION AND SAFETY STANDARDS
SUBPART G-PLUMBING SYSTEMS
§ 3280.603 General requirements.
(a) Minimum requirements. Any plumbing system installed in a manufactured home shall conform, at least, with the
provisions of this subpart.
(1) General The plumbing system shall be of durable material free from defective workmanship, and so designed and
constructed as to give satisfactory service for a reasonable life expectancy.
(2) Conservation. Water closets shall be selected and adjusted to use the minimum quantity of water consistent with
proper performance and cleaning.
(3) Connection to drainage system. All plumbing, fixtures, drains, appurtenances, and appliances designed or used to
receive or discharge liquid waste or sewage shall be connected to the manufactured home drainage system in a manner
provided by this standard.
(4) Workmanship. All design, construction, and workmanship shall be in conformance with accepted engineering
practices and shall be of such character as to secure the results sought to be obtained by this standard.
(5) Components. Plumbing materials, devices, fixtures, fittings, equipment, appliances, appurtenance, and accessories
intended for use in or attached to a manufactured home shall conform to one of the applicable standards referenced in §
3280.604. Where an applicable standard is not referenced, or an alternative recognized standard is utilized, the plumbing
component shall be listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, inspection agency or other qualified organization
as suitable for the intended use.
(6) Prohibited fittings and practices.
(i) Drainage or vent piping shall not be drilled and tapped for the purpose of making connections.

(ii) Except as specifically provided elsewhere in this standard, vent pipes shall not be used as waste or drain pipes.
(iii) Fittings, connections, devices, or methods of installation that obstruct or retard the flow of sewage, or air in the
drainage or venting systems in an amount greater than the normal frictional resistance to flow shall not be used unless
their use is acceptable in this standard or their use is accepted as having a desirable and acceptable function of ultimate
benefit to the proper and continued functioning of the plumbing system.
(iv) Cracks, holes, or other imperfections in materials shall not be concealed by welding, brazing, or soldering or by
paint, wax. tar, or other leak-sealing or repairing agents.
(v) Piping, fixtures or equipment shall be located so as not to interfere with the normal use or with the normal operation
and use of windows, doors or other required facilities.
(vi) Galvanized pipe shall not be bent or welded.
(7) Alignment of fittings. All valves, pipes, and fittings shall be installed in correct relationship to the direction of flow.
(b) Protective requirements.
(1) Cutting structural members. Structural members shall not be unnecessarily or carelessly weakened by cutting or
notching.
(2) Exposed piping. All piping, pipe threads, hangers, and support exposed to the weather, water, mud, and road hazard,
and subject to damage therefrom, shall be painted, coated, wrapped, or otherwise protected from deterioration.
(3) Road damage. Pipes, supports, drains, outlets, or drain hoses shall not extend or protrude in a manner where they
could be unduly subjected to damage during transit.
(4) Freezing. All piping and fixtures subject to freezing temperatures shall be insulated or protected to prevent freezing,
under normal occupancy. The manufacturer shall provide: (i) Written installation instructions for the method(s) required
for compliance to this section; (ii) a statement in his installation instructions that if heat tape is used it shall be listed for
use with manufactured homes; (iii) a receptacle outlet for the use of a heat tape located on the underside of the
manufactured home within 2 feet of the water supply inlet. The receptacle outlet provided shall not be placed on a
branch circuit which is protected by a ground fault circuit interrupter.
(5) All piping, except the fixture trap, shall be designed to allow drainage.
(6) Rodent resistance. All exterior openings around piping and equipment shall be sealed to resist the entrance of
rodents.
(7) Piping and electrical wiring shall not pass through the same holes in walls, floors or roofs. Plastic piping shall not be
exposed to heat in excess of manufacturers recommendation or radiation from beat producing appliances.
[40 FR 58752, Dec. 18, 1975, as amended at 42 FR 54383, Oct. 5, 1977. Redesignated at 44 FR 20679, Apr. 6, 1979, as
amended at 47 FR 28092, June 29, 1982; 58 FR 55012, Oct. 25, 1993]
24 C. F. R. § 3280.603
24 CFR § 3280.603
END OF DOCUMENT
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78-15-5

JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

A.L.R.—Allowance of punitive damages, 13
A L R 4th 52
Consequential loss of profits from injury to

property as element of damages in products
habibtj 89 A L R 4th 11

78-15-5. Alteration or modification of product after sale
as substantial contributing cause — Manufacturer or seller not liable.
For purposes of Section 78-27-38, fault shall include an alteration or
modification of the product, which occurred subsequent to the sale by the
manufacturer or seller to the initial user or consumer, and which changed the
purpose, use, function, design, or intended use or manner of use of the product
from that for which the product was originally designed, tested, or mtended
History: C. 1953, 78-15-5, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 5; 1989, ch. 119, § 2.
Severability Clauses. — Laws 1989, ch
119, § 4 provides that if any provision of the act
(which enacted § 78 15-3 and amended this
section), or the application of any provision to

an> person or circumstance is held invalid the
remainder of the act is to be given effect without the invalid provision or application
Cross-References. — Comparative neghgence, §§ 78-27-37, 78-27-38

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Alteration or modification required.
This section did not apply where there was no
alteration or modification of the product which
changed its purpose or use from that for which
it was designed Mulherin v Ingersoll-Rand
Co , 628 P2d 1301 (Utah 1981)

This section requires some sort of phvsical
alteration or modification of the product itself
which leaves the product in a different condition or form than it was in when it left the
manufacturer's or seller's hands Beacham v
Lee-Norse, 714 F 2 d 1010 (10th Cir 1983)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young L a w Review. — Survey of
Utah Strict Products Liability Law From Hahn
to the Present and Beyond, 1992 B Y U L Rev
1173
A.L.R. — Statute precluding or limiting recovery where product has been altered or modified after leaving hands of manufacturer or
seller, 4 l A L R 4 t h 4 7
Alteration of product after it leaves hands of
manufacturer or seller as affecting liability for

product-caused harm, 41 A L R 4th 1251
Products liability product misuse defense, 65
A L R 4th 263
Products liability injury caused by product
as a result of being tampered with, 67
A L R 4th 964
Liability for injury or death allegedly caused
by spoilage or contamination of beverage, 87
A L R 4th 804

78-15-6. Defect or defective condition making product
unreasonably dangerous — Rebuttable presumption.
In any action for damages for personal injury, death, or property damage
allegedly caused by a defect in a product
(1) No product shall be considered to have a defect or to be m a defective
condition, unless at the time the product was sold by the manufacturer or
other initial seller, there was a defect or defective condition in the product
which made the product unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.
408

PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT

78-15-6

(2) As used m this act, "unreasonably dangerous" means that the
product was dangerous to an extent beyond which would be contemplated
by the ordinary and prudent buyer, consumer or user of that product m
that community considering the product's characteristics, propensities,
risks, dangers and uses together with any actual knowledge, training, or
experience possessed by that particular buyer, user or consumer
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption that a product is free from any
defect or defective condition where the alleged defect in the plans or
designs for the product or the methods and techmques of manufacturing,
inspecting and testing the product were in conformity with government
standards established for that industry which were m existence at the
time the plans or designs for the product or the methods and techniques of
manufacturing, inspecting and testing the product were adopted
History: C. 1953, 78-15-6, e n a c t e d by L.
1977, ch. 149, § 6.
Meaning of "this act." — The phrase "this

act"m Subsection (2) means Laws 1977, Chapter 149 which enacted this chapter

NOTES TO DECISIONS
plaintiff would have done had he or she been
adequately warned plaintiff should be afforded
a rebuttable presumption that he or she would
have followed an adequate warning had one
been provided House v Armour of A m , Inc
886 P 2 d 542 (Utah Ct App 1994), aff'd, 929
P 2 d 340 (Utah 1996)

ANALYSIS

Burden of proof
Drugs
Duty to warn
—Causation
—Label warning
—Open and obvious danger
—Safer product
Evidence
Lessors
Simultaneous cause of action
Test for strict liability
Cited
Burden of proof.
To avoid summary judgment, plaintiff needed
to assert a defect or defective condition In
statutory terms, plaintiff needed to submit
some evidence that there was a defect m the
product that she alleged had caused her injuries, that the defect existed at the time the
product was sold, and that the defect made the
product unreasonably dangerous Klemert v
Kimball Elevator Co , 854 P 2 d 1025 (Utah Ct
App 1993)
Drugs.
A drug approved by the United States Food
and Drug Administration (FDA), properly prepared, compounded, packaged, and distributed,
cannot as a matter of law be "defective" in the
absence of proof of maccurate, incomplete, misleading, or fraudulent information furnished by
the manufacturer in connection with FDA approval Grundberg v Upjohn Co , 813 P 2d 89
(Utah 1991)
Duty to warn.
—Causation.
When it cannot be demonstrated what the

—Label warning.
In a wrongful death action involving the use
of a bullet-resistant vest by deceased law enforcement officer, whether the label, which did
not include a warning that the vest alone would
not stop n n e fire, provided adequate warning
was a question of fact to be judged in light of the
ordmarv knowledge common to members of the
law enforcement community House v Armour
of Am , Inc , 886 P 2 d 542 (Utah Ct App 1994),
aff'd, 929 P 2 d 340 (Utah 1996)
—Open and obvious danger.
The presence of an "open and obvious" danger
is merely one factor for the trier of fact to
consider when assessing the liability of the
defendant in a strict liability case — it does not
operate as a complete bar to the injured party's
recovery House v Armour of Am , Inc , 886 P 2d
542 (Utah Ct App 1994), aff'd, 929 P 2 d 340
(Utah 1996)
A broad grant of immunity from strict liability claims based on design defects should be
extended to FDA-approved prescription drugs
m Utah Grundberg v Upjohn Co , 813 P 2d 89
(Utah 1991)
—Safer product.
A nailer was not defective, and the defendant's decision to market the product was not
negligent, since there was no duty for a manufacturer to warn or inform consumers that a
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a c]
, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, sn ^ay time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show t h a t there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts t h a t appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion t h a t the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judg-

ment" for "move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor
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Cited in Zion's First Nat'l Bank v
t, nnemore, 655 P2d 1111 (Utah 1982), State v
fnes 656 P 2 d 1012 (Utah 1982\ State v
tolasquez, 672 P2d 1254 (Utah 1983), In re
ILK 728 P2d 988 (Utah 1986), State v
Walker, 743 P 2 d 191 (Utah 1987), State ex rel
qtate Dep't of Social Servs v Woods, 744 P 2 d
015 (Utah Ct App 1987), Tripp v Vaughn, 747
P2d 1051 (Utah Ct App 1987), State v Barber,
747 P2d 436 (Utah Ct App 1987), Miller v
L b e r 749 P2d 1274 (Utah Ct App 1988),
State v Thomas, 777 P 2 d 445 (Utah 1989),
Mernam v Mernam, 799 P2d 1172 (Utah Ct

Rule 802

App 1990), State v Martinez, 811 P 2 d 205
(Utah Ct App 1991), State v Taylor, 818 P 2 d
561 (Utah Ct App 1991), Department of Air
Force v Swider, 824 P 2 d 448 (Utah Ct App
1991), State \ Allen, 839 P 2 d 291 (Utah 1992),
State v Seale, 853 P 2 d 862 (Utah 1993), State
\ Arguelles, 921 P 2 d 439 (Utah 1996), State v
Perez, 924 P 2 d 1 (Utah Ct App 1996), Julian v
State, 966 P 2 d 249 (Utah 1998), Fishbaugh v
Utah Power & Light 969 P 2 d 403 (Utah 1998),
West Valley City v Hutto, 2000 UT App 188, 5
P3d 1

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi
dence 1983 — Part III, 1995 Utah L Rev 683
Bngham Young Law Review. — The Hobgoblin of the Federal Rules of Evidence An
Analysis of Rule 801(d)(1)(B), Prior Consistent
Statements and a New Proposal, 1987 B Y U L
Rev 231
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Constitutional Imphcations, 15 J Contemp L 81
(1989)
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am J u r 2d Evidence
§ 493 et seq
C.J.S. — 31A C J S Evidence § 259 et seq
AX.R. — Admissibility of impeached wit-

ness' prior consistent statement — modern
state criminal cases, 58 A L R 4th 1014
Admissibihty of tape recording or transcript
of "911" emergency telephone call, 3 A L R 5th
784
Admissibility m evidence of composite picture or sketch produced by police to identify
offender, 23 A L R 5th 672
Admissibihty as "not hearsay" of statement
by party's attorney under Federal Rules of
Evidence 801(d)(2)(C) or 801(d)(2)(D), 117
A L R Fed 599
Interpreter or translator as party's agent for
purposes of "admission by party-opponent" exception to hearsay rule (Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(D)), 121 A L R Fed 611

Rule 802. Hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by these rules.
Advisory Committee N o t e . — This rule is
Rule 802 of the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(1974), and is the same as the first paragraph of
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971)
Cross-References. —Affidavits, taking and
certification of, § 78-26-5 et seq
Contemporaneous entries and writings of decedent as prima facie evidence, § 78-25-8

Judgment, entry of, U R C P 58A
Judgment roll m criminal case, contents and
filing, U R C n m P 22
Marriage certificate, issuance and filing,
§§ 30-1-6, 30-1-12
Official records as evidence, § 78-25-3,
U R C P 44
Recording conveyances, § 57-3-101 et seq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
In general
Chemical breath analysis
Nonhearsay
Purpose
In general.
Hearsay is generally not admissible on the
ground that it lacks trustworthiness for two
basic reasons (1) the person who purports to
know the facts is not stating them under oath,
(2) that person is not present for cross-examination State v Sibert 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P 2d
388 (1957)
Chemical breath analysis.
Section 41-6-44 3, governing the admission of
chemical breath analysis, is a valid statutory

exception to the hearsay rule Layton City v
Bennett, 741 P2d 965 (Utah Ct App 1987),
cert denied, 765 P2d 1277 (Utah 1988)
Nonhearsay.
Pohce officer's recounting of victim's report of
the crime was not hearsay because it was not
presented for the truth of the matter, but to
explain why the officer took the investigative
steps that he did State v Bryant, 965 P 2 d 539
(Utah Ct App 1998)
Purpose.
The hearsay rule has as its declared purpose
the exclusion of evidence not subject to crossexamination concerning the truthfalness of the
matters asserted State v Long, 721 P 2 d 483
(Utah 1986)
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N e w trial.
Provision that notice of hearing on motion be
served not later than five days before the time
specified for the hearing does not apply to
motion for new trial and such notice is not
integral part of motion for new trial; rule does
not change procedure whereby a motion can be
called up at any time parties desire to do so.
Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149, 356 P.2d
275 (1960).
—Compliance w i t h rule.
Actual notice.
The trial court may dispense with technical
compliance with the five-day notice provision of
Subdivision (d) if there is satisfactory proof that
a party had actual notice and time to prepare to
meet the questions raised by the motion.
Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236
(1974); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794
P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992).
Ineffective n o t i c e .
Eight days' notice of trial was ineffective to
give five days' notice when notice was by mail,
since Saturday, Sunday, and three days for
mailing were to be deducted from eight-day
period. Mickelson v. Shelley, 542 P.2d 740 (Utah
1975).
Time to prepare.
Plaintiff was not prejudiced by two-day notice of hearing to release property subject to
writ of attachment where he had adequate time
to prepare for hearing and defendant was required to post cashier's check in lieu of security.

Rule 7

Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236
(1974).
—Continuance.
Surprise.
Neither plaintiff's failure to serve motion for
continuance five days before date set for hearing nor failure to file affidavits accompanying
motion justified denial of motion where plaintiff's counsel did not learn of reason for plaintiff's inability to appear at hearing in time to
make motion five days before hearing and Rule
40(b) does not expressly require affidavits to
accompany motion for continuance. Bairas v.
Johnson, 13 Utah 2d 269, 373 P.2d 375 (1962).
Cited in Goddard v. Bundy, 121 Utah 299,
241 P.2d 462 (1952); Mower v. Bohmke, 9 Utah
2d 52, 337 P.2d 429 (1959); Western States
Thrift & Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58,
504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Connelly v. Rathjen, 547
P.2d 1336 (Utah 1976); Genuine Parts Co. v.
Larson, 555 P.2d 285 (Utah 1976); McEwen
Irrigation Co. v. Michaud, 558 P.2d 606 (Utah
1976); Utah Chiropractic Ass'n v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc'y, 579 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1978);
Reagan Outdoor Adv., Inc. v. Utah DOT, 589
P.2d 782 (Utah 1979); Albrecht v. Uranium
Servs., Inc., 596 P.2d 1025 (Utah 1979); Ute-Cal
Land Dev. v. Intermountain Stock Exch., 628
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1981); Bennion v. Hansen, 699
P.2d 757 (Utah 1985); K.O. v. Denison, 748 P.2d
588 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); P & B Land, Inc. v.
Klungervik, 751 P.2d 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1988);
Huston v. Lewis, 818 R2d 531 (Utah 1991);
Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367
(Utah 1996); Low v. City of Monticello, 2002 UT
90, 54 P.3d 1153.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 20 et
seq.; 56 Am. Jur. 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders
§ 10; 62B Am. Jur. 2d Process §§ 114-117,
227-229.
C.J.S. — 60 C.J.S. Motions and Orders § 8;
66 C.J.S. Notice § 27 et seq.; 71 C.J.S. Pleading
§§ 98, 114, 219; 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 72, 78.
A.L.R. — Vacating judgment or granting new
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute
or rules of court, 3 A.L.R.3d 1191.
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to
timely prosecute action, 15 A.L.R.3d 674.

Validity of service of summons or complaint
on Sunday or holiday, 63 A.L.R.3d 423.
Amendment, after expiration of time for filing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845.
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L.R.4th
213.
What constitutes bringing an action to trial
or other activity in case sufficient to avoid
dismissal under state statute or court rule
requiring such activity within stated time, 32
A.L.R.4th 840.

PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim;
a third-party complaint, if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except that the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.

Rule 7
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(b) Motions, An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition. Within five days after sendee of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a
proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of
argument without leave of the court.
The court may permit a party to file an over-length memorandum upon ex
parte application and a showing of good cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.
(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts t h a t is controverted, the opposing
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported b}^
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For
an}^ additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds t h a t the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively
decided.
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(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement,
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not
regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of t h a t
party's motion, memoranda and supporting
documents and, if so, when and where to deliver them.
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just
orders upon motion.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 2003 amendment deleted "denominated as such" after
"counterclaim" in Subdivision (a); rewrote Subdivisions (b) and (c); and added Subdivisions (d)
to (g).
The 2004 amendment inserted "or in proceedings before a court commissioner" in Subdivision (b); substituted the first paragraph in
Subdivision (c)(2) for a list of maximum lengths
for different types of memoranda; in Subdivision (f)(2), substituted "serve upon the other
parties" for "file" in the first sentence and added
the last sentence; in Subdivision (g), substituted "recommendation" for "recommended order" several times and substituted "made in
open court" for "entered" and added the clause
beginning "or, if" in the second sentence; and
added the second paragraph of the Advisory
Committee Note.
Compiler's N o t e s . — This rule is similar to
Rule 7, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amendment of plead-*
ings to conform to evidence, motion for,
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3.
Consolidation of defenses made by motion,
U.R.C.P. 12(g).

Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P.
12(i).
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50.
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41.
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of
complaint in, § 78-34-6.
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P.
43(b).
Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69A et seq.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required,
§ 78-36-9.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Partition of property, complaint to set forth
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2.
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P 9.
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.C.P 60.
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5.
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
65B(a).
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 782-4.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
U.R.C.P. 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P.
6(d).
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for cause any prospective trial juror in the trial of a civil action. Such objectil
must be heard and disposed of by the court in the same manner as a motif!
s
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes.
Rule 53, F.R.C.P.

- This rule is similar to

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Challenging of jurni
for cause. U.R.C.P. 47(f).
^

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Report.
—Failure to object.
Waiver.
Scope of appointment.
Status as judicial officer.
Cited.

scope of his appointment by investigating i
reporting on the issue of attorney's fees sii
the court had already ordered an award H
attorney's fees and the parties had no :
that the master was to review that award j
did the parties have an opportunity to pa
pate in the master's proceedings. Plumb*
State, 809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990)

Report.
— F a i l u r e to object.
Waiver.
One who made no objection to master's report
as required by this rule could not question the
report for the first tune on appeal from district
court order adopting the master's findings.
Score v. Wilson, 611 P.2d 367 (Utah 1980).

S t a t u s a s j u d i c i a l officer.
A special master has the duties and obligali
tions of a judicial officer, and thus should nd|
engage in unethical ex parte contacts with thl
judge overseeing the case on matters pertinent
to the substance of the referral. Plumb v States
809 P.2d 734 (Utah 1990).

S c o p e of appointment.
A special master who was directed to review
requests for cost reimbursements exceeded the

C i t e d in Jones, "Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366 (Utah 1996)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity
§§ 226, 228; 66 Am. Jur. 2d References §§ 1 et
seq., 30 et seq.
C.J.S. — 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 515, 520, 521
to 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 539 et seq.
A-L.R. — Bankruptcy, right of creditor who
has not filed timely petition for review of referee's order to participate in appeal secured by
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914.
Power of successor or substituted master or

referee to render decision or enter judgment on
testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d
1079.
Referee's failure to file report within time
specified by statute, court order, or stipulation
as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R 4th 889.
What are "exceptional conditions'" justifying
reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 1
A.L.R. Fed. 922.

PART VII. JUDGMENT
Rule 54. J u d g m e n t s ; costs,
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and
any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a recital of
pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the
court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed by the court, a judgment shall
not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and I or involving multiple parties.
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express
determination by the court t h a t there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated,
t h a t adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer
t h a n all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or
parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
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before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and
liabilities of all the parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(c)(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by
default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose
favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief
in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several
claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the
ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(c)(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in
kind from, or exceed in amount, t h a t specifically prayed for in the demand for
judgment.
(d) Costs.
(d)(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be allowed as of
course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided,
however, where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the
action, other t h a n costs in connection with such appeal or other proceeding for
review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state
of Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed onl}^ to the extent permitted
by law.
(d)(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days
after the entry of judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs
are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum
thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct,
and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or
proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs
taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of
or subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include
in any judgment signed by him any interest on the verdict or decision from the
time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or ascertained.
The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained,
in any case where not included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in
a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar notation
thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
(Amended effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985; November 1, 2003.)
Amendment N o t e s . — The 2003 amendment added the last sentence to Subdivision (a)
and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's N o t e s . — Subdivisions (d)(3)
and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the
appellate court and costs in original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed
with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, effective J a n u a r y 1, 1985. See,

now, Rule 34(d), Utah RApp.P.
This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b).
State, payment of costs awarded against,
§ 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims,
U.R.C.P. 62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78-46-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of
right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.

— In general.
—Challenge of award.
—Depositions.
—Discretionary.
—Expenses of preparation for action.

